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Abstract
Collective decision procedures should balance the incentives they provide
to acquire information and their capacity to aggregate private information.
In a decision problem in which a project can be accepted or rejected once
information about its quality has been acquired or not, we compare the per-
formance of a delegation structure with that of two voting procedures. Dele-
gation makes one’s acceptance decision pivotal by definition. The decisiveness
of one’s vote in a voting procedure depends on the other agent’s vote. This
in turn determines the decision to acquire information. In the debate about a
rational choice foundation of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, the distribution of
information was left exogenous. Mixed (acceptance) strategies were required
to validate the Theorem. Endogenizing information acquisition as we do re-
veals mixed (acceptance) strategies to be detrimental for welfare as they lead
to indifference between buying and not buying information.
∗Otto H. Swank, professor, Phone: +31 10 40 81448, Fax: +31 10 40 89147, E-mail:
swank@few.eur.nl, and Bauke Visser, assistant professor, Phone: +31 10 40 81449, Fax: +31 10
40 89149, E-mail: visser@few.eur.nl. Both: Department of Economics, Erasmus University Rot-
terdam, Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
Swank also with Tinbergen Institute. Please send correspondence to Bauke Visser.
1
1 lntroduction
This paper deals with the problem of selecting a decision rule for a group that has
to make a decision under uncertainty. We focus on situations where each individual
of the group can acquire information at a cost. Such situations are common. Let
us give three examples. First, in the U.S., legislative committees have gatekeeping
authority and proposal power. Committees are the “lords of their jurisdictional
domains” (Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997). Giving individual legislators incentives
to acquire information is often considered as the rationale for granting so much
power to legislative committees (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1997). Second, some business
decisions are also made collectively, for example in management teams, whereas
others are made by individual members of the team. In either case, the effort
involved in gathering advice and preparing the decision can be substantial. Finally,
the editor of this journal has kindly requested specialists to referee our article. The
referees are supposed to take great pains with studying our paper.
We study a model in which two agents have to make a binary decision about a
project. The agents’ common goal is to make the correct decision. The problem is
that the correct decision is unknown. Each agent can buy information. By buying
information an agent may learn the correct decision. We analyze three decision
procedures. In the first one, the decision about the project is delegated to one
individual. This agent first chooses whether or not to acquire information and
then chooses whether or not to implement the project. In the two other decision
procedures, the decision about the project is made by voting. With two agents, two
voting rules make sense: implementation either requires one agent to vote favourably
or both agents. When the decision about the project is made by a voting rule, each
agent can buy information.
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Our paper is closely related to the literature on Condorcet’s Jury Theorem and
the literature on organizational decision making by error—prone agents. Our pa-
per deviates from these literatures in that the decision to acquire information is
made endogenous. The recent literature on Condorcet’s Jury Theorem focuses on
the way alternative decision rules aggregate private information (see, for example,
Young, 1988, Ladha, 1992 and Piketty, 1999). This literature typically assumes a
distribution of information among agents that is exogenously specified.
The literature on organizational decision making by fallible agents examines
how alternative organization structures affect the economic consequences of errors
individuals make (see, for example, Ben—Yashar and Nitzan, 1997; Sah and Stiglitz,
1988). In this literature, the likelihood of an erroneous decision is exogenously
specified. In our model each individual can improve the quality of a decision at a
cost. Relaxing the assumption that information is manna from heaven forces one to
evaluate organizational decision rules both in terms of their capacity to aggregate
private information and on the basis of their adequacy in providing incentives to
gather this private information in the first place.1
We derive three main results. First, we show that delegation provides a stronger
incentive to acquire information than voting. The reason is simple. For an individ-
ual, the benefits of acquiring information depend on the probability that his vote
is decisive. Under delegation, the vote of the decision maker is decisive by defini-
tion. Under a voting rule, the voting behavior of the other agent determines the
decisiveness of one’s vote.
Second, Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) show that always voting in line with
one’s information is not an equilibrium strategy when decisions are made by majority
1In our model, information is a public good that raises a free-rider problem. None of the three
decision rules always solves this problem.
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voting. In other words, rational voters follow a mixed strategy. They conclude “[a]
satisfactory rational choice foundation for the claim that majorities invariably “do
better” than individuals, therefore, has yet to be derived” (p. 34). Wit (1998)
establishes that allowing for mixed strategies in fact saves the Condorcet’s Jury
Theorem. We show that when information is endogenous, mixed strategies in the
vote decision lead to disastrous outcomes. When agents are indifferent between
voting for and voting against implementation, they are also indifferent between
acquiring information and remaining ignorant. The expected payoff to each agent
is then equal to the expected pay off when no information is acquired at all.
Our third result is less pessimistic about voting rules. We show that when equi-
libria exist in which voters mix in the vote decision, there also exists an equilibrium
in which the agents vote sincerely and buy information with a positive probability.
When the costs are low, one of the voting rules is usually superior to delegation
from a social point of view. Moreover, the more a second piece of information adds
to a first piece of information, the more atractive voting becomes.
The punch line of this paper is that endogenizing information has important
consequences for the relative performance of decision rules.
Our paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. We then
analyze the relationship between the appropriateness of the alternative decision rules
on the one hand and agents making progressively more consious choices on the other
hand. In Section 3, we assume that agents always buy information and vote sincerely.
In Section 4, we relax the assumption of sincere voting. In Section 5, we relax the
assumption that agents always buy information. Section 6 concludes.
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2 The Model
There are two agents, i = 1, 2, who have to decide whether to implement a project,
X = 1, or to reject it, X = 0. The payoff of implemented projects accrues to both
agents, and depends on the state of nature, θ. This state can be either good or
bad, θ ∈ {G,B}. The agents have identical preferences over outcomes: both prefer
implementation in the good state, and rejection in the bad state. The payoff of
rejected projects is independent of the state of nature. Formally,
Ui (X = 1;G) = p+ h
Ui (X = 1;B) = p− h (1)
Ui (X = 0) = 0
where p−h < 0 < p+h, or h > |p|. The expected value of an implemented project,
p, can be positive, negative, or zero.
The state of nature is unknown when the agents decide. Both states have equal
prior probability. Agent i can obtain a private signal si about the state of nature, si ∈
{g, b}, before a decision is being taken. A signal costs C. This signal is informative
with probability π, and uninformative with probability 1−π. An informative signal
fully reveals the state of nature, while an uninformative signal adds no information
to the prior beliefs of an agent. That is, in case of an informative signal Pr (G|gi) =
Pr (B|bi) = 1, whereas in case of an uninformative signal Pr (G|gi) = Pr (B|bi) = 12 ,
where gi (bi) stands for si = g (si = b).
Once any agent who decided to obtain a signal has received one, a decision is
taken about the project. The agents do not communicate once they have received
any signal and before deciding on the project. We consider three commonly used
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decision rules, R. First, the decision can be taken by delegation, R = D. In this
case, one agent is made responsible for the project. The other agent does not buy a
signal. The second and third rule involve voting. The second decision rule requires
just one agent to vote favorably for the project to be implemented, R = V1, whereas
the third rule requires the consent of both agents for implementation to take place,
R = V2.
Throughout, we assume that πh > p. As we show below, the implication
of this assumption is that if the decision were delegated to one agent, his decision
about the project would be in accordance with his signal, if bought.
3 The Benchmark Case
In this section, we analyze the alternative decision rules under the assumption that
agents participating in the decision making process always buy a signal. Moreover,
we assume sincere voting. We discuss the three decision rules in turn.
3.1 Delegation
Let agent i be the agent who is made responsible for the decision about the project.
If i receives signal si = g and chooses implementation, her expected payoff equals
p+ πh. If i receives signal si = b, implementation yields an expected payoff p− πh.
Since πh > p, i chooses implementation if and and only if she receives signal si = g.
The total expected payoff under delegation, that is the sum of the expected payoff
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to the two agents under delegation, equals
E (Π;R = D) = 2(Pr (G) Pr (s = g|G) [p + h]
+Pr (B) Pr (s = g|B) [p− h])− C
= p+ πh− C (2)
3.2 Voting Rule V1
When individuals vote sincerely, voting rule V1 implies that the project is imple-
mented unless both agents receive signal si = b. The total expected payoff is
E (Π;R = V1) = 2(Pr (G)
£
1− Pr (s = b|G)2¤ [p+ h]
+Pr (B)
£
1− Pr (s = b|B)2¤ [p− h]− C)
=
µ
3
2
− 1
2
π2
¶
p+ πh− 2C (3)
3.3 Voting Rule V2
The project is implemented only if both agents receive signal si = g. The expected
total payoff equals
E (Π;R = V2) = 2(Pr (G)
£
Pr (g|G)2¤ [p + h]
+Pr (B)
£
Pr (g|B)2¤ [p− h]− C)
=
1
2
¡
1 + π2
¢
p+ πh− 2C (4)
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3.4 Delegation or Voting?
A comparison of the expected payoff of the voting rules V1 and V2 shows that
the single acceptance rule is better than the double acceptance rule if and only
if the expected value of the project is larger than zero. That is, E (Π;R = V1) >
E (Π;R = V2) if and only if p > 0. The outcome of the voting rules differs only if the
two agents obtain opposite signals: under V1 the project would be accepted, while
under V2 it would be rejected. Combining the information of contradictory signals
suggests that the value of implementation equals p. If p > 0, the project should be
accepted, and hence V1 is best, whereas if p < 0, the project should be rejected, and
hence V2 is best. It is better to check twice if the project is relatively bad, while it
is better not to be too strict if the project is relatively good.
The best voting rule is better than delegation if and only if the cost of a second
signal are lower than the increase in expected payoff:
C <
1
2
¡
1− π2¢ |p| (5)
Voting yields a higher expected payoff than delegation if the second signal adds
sufficient information to the first, and if the absolute value of the expected profits
is relatively high. The more informative the first signal (i.e., the higher π), the less
the second signal adds, and the more attractive delegation becomes. Similarly, the
smaller the absolute value of p, the closer the expected revenues of delegation and
voting, gross of the costs of acquiring signals.
If the signals are for free (C = 0), voting is always the best. Exclusion of
individuals from the decision—making process would imply not fully utilitising the
existing information. This is the basic argument of the Jury Theorem, which, in the
simple setting used here, simply says that two persons know more than one.
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Delegation and voting procedure V1 perform equally well for C = 12 (1− π2) p:
E (Π;R = D) = E (Π;R = V1) =
1
2
p (1 + π2) + πh. Had it been possible not to buy
a signal, the comparison would have been with the expected payoff to an individual
ensuing from not buying a signal, p under both delegation and V1. Hence, if C =
1
2
(1− π2) p, no signal would have been bought if πh−p
2
<
p(1−π2)
2
. If this inequality
holds, V1 would have performed at least as well as D for all values of C. We come
back to this inequality in section 6.
4 Strategic Voting
In this section we relax the assumption that agents vote in line with their signal,
but allow for strategic voting. Following Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), we focus
on voting rules which constitute a symmetric Nash equilibrium. As allowing for
strategic voting has no consequences for the outcomes when the decision about the
project is delegated to one agent, this section only discusses the decision rules which
involve voting. Agents still buy a signal at cost C.
In the rest of the paper we confine the analysis to the case p > 0. The discussion
paper version of this article also deals with the case p ≤ 0.
4.1 Voting Rule V1
Under voting rule V1 there are two equilibria. In the first one, each agent votes
for implementation, irrespective of his signal. We refer to this equilibrium as the
‘uninformative equilibrium’. In the second equilibrium, each agent votes in line with
his signal. As a consequence, the project will be implemented, unless both players
receive an unfavorable signal.
The existence of two equilibria raises the issue of equilibrium selection. The un-
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informative equilibrium will be excluded as it involves weakly dominated strategies.
Notice that the informative equilibrium leads to the same outcomes as in Section
3.2. Hence, allowing for strategic voting does not affect the outcomes when the
decision rule is V1.
4.2 Voting Rule V2
As in Subsection 4.1, an uninformative equilibrium exists: voting for rejection ir-
respective of one’s signal is an optimal response if the other player behaves in the
same way. However, this uninformative equilibrium is rather unlikely, as voting
for implementation weakly dominates voting for rejection when an agent receives a
favorable signal.
In contrast to Subsection 4.1, sincere voting is not an equilibrium. To see this,
suppose that agent 1 votes in line with his signal. Then, it is optimal for agent
2 to vote for implementation when he receives an unfavorable signal. The reason
is that agents 2 prefers implementation to rejection unless both agents receive an
unfavorable signal.
To examine whether there exists an equilibrium in mixed strategies, define γi as
the probability that agent i votes for implementation when si = b. Suppose si = b.
When i votes for rejection his payoff equals 0. When he votes for implementation,
his payoff depends on j’s vote:
(p+ h) Pr (G|si = b)
£
Pr (sj = g|G) + Pr (sj = b|G) γj
¤
+(p− h) Pr (B|bi)
£
Pr (sj = g|B) + Pr (sj = b|B) γj
¤
=
p
2
¡
1− π2¢+ γj ³p2 ¡1 + π2¢− hπ´ (6)
For a mixed strategy profile to be an equilibrium, an agent i who receives si = b
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must be indifferent between voting for implementation and voting for rejection. This
occurs when
γj =
p (1− π2)
2πh− p (1 + π2) (7)
As we limit attention to symmetric equilibria, γ∗ = γi = γj in equilibrium. Since
πh > p by assumption, γ∗ ∈ (0, 1) holds.
Because agents are indifferent between voting for implementation and voting for
rejection when their signal is negative, the expected payoff in this equilibrium is
equal to the expected payoff in Subsection 3.3.
5 Costly Signals and Strategic Voting
We now relax the assumption that agents always buy a signal. Thus, at the be-
ginnning of the game agents have to decide whether to buy a signal or not.
5.1 Delegation
In case of delegation, one agent decides first whether or not to buy a signal, and
then decides whether to implement the project. Suppose the agent decides not to
buy a signal. Because p > 0, it is optimal for him to vote for implementation
and his expected payoff equals p. Now suppose the agent decides to buy a signal.
Our assumption that πh > p ensures that it is optimal for the agent to choose
implementation if and only if si = g. The expected payoff of buying is equal to
1
2
(p+ πh)− C. It immediately follows that the agent buys a signal if and only if
C <
1
2
(πh− p) . (8)
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Obviously, if (8) holds, the total expected surplus amounts to (p+ πh)−C, whereas
if it does not hold, the total expected surplus equals 2p. Notice that maximization of
the total expected surplus would have required the acquisition of a signal whenever
C < (πh− p); however, for 1
2
(πh− p) < C < πh− p, an individual has no incentive
to buy a signal.
5.2 Voting Rule V 1
In the case where single acceptance suffices for a project to be implemented an
obvious Nash equilibrium profile is for both agents not to buy a signal and to vote
favorably. The expected total surplus equals 2p.
This is not the only equilibrium, however. To find the other equilibria, we first
eliminate dominated strategies. Buying a signal, and always voting Y (or N) ir-
respective of the signal received is dominated by always voting Y (or N) and not
buying a signal (it saves costs, without affecting expected payoff ex post). Moreover,
voting in line with your signal dominates voting contrary to your signal (i.e., Y when
gi and N when bi strictly dominates N when gi and Y when bi). The remaining un-
dominated strategies are therefore: buy signal, and vote in line with signal received;
don’t buy signal, vote Y ; don’t buy signal, vote N . Let βi be the probability that
i votes Y when he has not bought a signal. Let αi be the probability that i buys a
signal.
Suppose i has not bought a signal. Conditional on not buying a signal, he votes
N if the ensuing expected payoff exceeds p, the expected payoff of voting Y . If i
votes N , the expected payoff depends on j’s decision. If j buys a signal, the project
is implemented when gj, in which case the expected payoff equals p+ πh. If j does
not buy a signal, the project is implemented with probability βj, and the expected
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payoff equals p. Formally, if i does not buy a signal, he votes Y if and only if
p > αj
1
2
(p + πh) + (1− αj) βjp (9)
In a mixed strategy equilibrium, players are indifferent between voting Y and N .
Because we limit our analysis to symmetric equilibria, it follows that
β∗ =
(2− α) p− απh
2 (1− α) p (10)
As πh > p by assumption, β∗ < 1. That is, there is always a chance that not
buying a signal will lead to voting against2. The intuition is as follows: Remember
that in this section single acceptance is sufficient for a project to be implemented.
Hence, voting Y although one has not bought a signal, may mean losing valuable
information bought by the other agent. This becomes the more costly (i) the more
likely the other person buys a signal, i.e, the higher α; (ii) the larger the variance
in the payoff, i.e., the larger h; and (iii) the more informative the signal, i.e, the
larger π. This is borne out by Equation (10). In fact, if the probability of buying a
signal is sufficiently large, one will vote Y with zero probability in case no signal was
bought: if α ≥ 2p
p+πh
, β∗ = 0. The value of lost information diminishes the higher
the ex ante expected payoff of the project. As a result, β∗ increases in p.
The next step is to determine the probability that each player buys a signal.
2Remember that we already determined that not buying and voting Y forms an equilibrium
strategy.
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Suppose that α∗ < 2p
p+πh
so that β∗ > 0. If i buys a signal his expected payoff equals
(p+ h) Pr (G) [αj
µ
π2 + 2π (1− π) + (1− π)2 3
4
¶
+(1− αj)
µ
π + (1− π) 1
2
+ (1− π) 1
2
β∗
¶
]
+ (p− h) Pr (B) [αj
µ
π (1− π) + (1− π)2 3
4
¶
(11)
+(1− αj)
µ
πβ∗ + (1− π) 1
2
+ (1− π) 1
2
β∗
¶
]− C
= αj
·
p
4
¡
3− π2¢+ πh
2
¸
+
(1− αj)
2
[p+ πh] + β∗
(1− αj)
2
(p− πh)− C
If i decides not to buy, expected payoff equals
(p+ h) Pr (G) [β∗ + (1− β∗) (αj Pr (gj|G) + (1− αj)β∗)] +
(p− h) Pr (B) [β∗ + (1− β∗) (αj Pr (gj|B) + (1− αj)β∗)]
= pβ∗ + (1− β∗)αj
µ
p+ πh
2
¶
+ (1− β∗) (1− αj)β∗p (12)
In a mixed strategy equilibrium, α∗ is such that Equations (11) and (12) have the
same value. Hence, the solution for α is α∗ = 4pc
π2(h2−p2) . For α
∗ < 2p
p+πh
to hold the
costs of buying a signal should be sufficiently small, C <
π2(h2−p2)
2(p+πh)
.
Above we saw that if α ≥ 2p
p+πh
, then β∗ = 0. We use Equations (11) and (12)
when β∗ = 0 to obtain the expressions for the expected payoff if i buys a signal,
αj
·
p
4
¡
3− π2¢+ πh
2
¸
+
(1− αj)
2
[p+ πh]− C (13)
and if i does not buy a signal,
αj
µ
p+ πh
2
¶
(14)
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In a mixed equilibrium players are indifferent between buying and not buying a
signal. Therefore
α∗ =
2 (p+ πh)− 4C
(1 + π2) p+ 2πh
(15)
From Equation (15) it follows that no signal is bought when they are too expensive
(C ≥ p+πh
2
), while a signal is bought with probability one if they are cheap enough
(C ≤ 1−π2
4
p). However, for β∗ = 0 to hold, we derived that α∗ ≥ 2p
p+πh
should hold
too. This restriction, in combination with Equation (15) gives rise to the inequality
C ≤ π
2(h2−p2)
2(p+πh)
. In summary:
If C ≤ π
2(h2−p2)
2(p+πh)
then three equilibria exist:
1. (α∗, β∗) = (0, 1)
2. (α∗, β∗) =
µ
4pc
π2(h2−p2) ,
2c(p+hπ)−π2(h2−p2)
4pc−π2(h2−p2)
¶
3. (α∗, β∗) =
³
Min
n
2(p+πh)−4c
(1+π2)p+2πh
, 1
o
, 0
´
If C >
π2(h2−p2)
2(p+πh)
, one equilibrium exists: (α∗, β∗) = (0, 1)
The existence of multi-equilibria when C ≤ π
2(h2−p2)
2(p+πh)
raises the problem of equilib-
rium selection. In the remaining part of this paper, we focus on the third equilibrium.
The main reason is that when evaluating the performance of V1, V2, and D, the first
two equilibria are not interesting. They both yield an expected total surplus of 2p,
which is always lower or equal than the expected payoff under delegation. The third
equilibrium leads to a higher expected total surplus if C <
π2(h2−p2)
2(p+πh)
. The surplus
is:
α (p+ πh) with α =
2 (p + πh)− 4c
(1 + π2) p+ 2πh
if C >
1
4
p
¡
1− π2¢ (16)
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and is
µ
3
2
− 1
2
π2
¶
p+ πh− 2c if C ≤ 1
4
p
¡
1− π2¢ (17)
Notice that by focusing on the third equilibrium, we give decision rule V1 the benefit
of the doubt when comparing it with delegation.
5.3 Voting Rule V2
In this case an obvious Nash equilibrium profile is for both agents not to buy a signal
and to vote N . The expected total surplus then equals zero. Moreover, if C > πh−p
2
,
a Nash equilibrium profile is for both agents not to buy a signal and vote Y . In the
Appendix, we show that another equilibrium exists if the cost of a signal is not too
large (C ≤ πh−p
2
). In this equilibrium, each agent votes Y if he has not bought a
signal or has received signal gi. Each agent buys a signal with probability
α∗ =
2(πh− p)− 4c
2πh− p(1 + π2) (18)
Notice that α∗ < 1. The reason for this result is that decision rule V2 is too strict.
As discussed in subsection 4.2, when agents always receive a signal, it is optimal
for each of them to vote sometimes Y when the signal is b. In this way, the agents
reduce the probability that the project is rejected when the agents receive conflicting
signals. When agents have to decide whether to buy a signal or not, they can reduce
the probability that the project will be rejected while its expected payoff is positive
by not buying a signal and voting Y .
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6 Evaluation
In this section, we compare the performance of the delegation structure and the
two voting rules when information is consciously gathered and strategic considera-
tions determine the vote cast. We summarise the performance of the three decision
procedures here
Expected surplus of delegation:
(p+ πh)− C for C < 1
2
(πh− p)
2p for C ≥ 1
2
(πh− p)
Expected surplus of voting procedure 1:¡
3
2
− 1
2
π2
¢
p+ πh− 2C C ≤ 1−π2
4
p
2(p+πh)−4C
(1+π2)p+2πh
(p+ πh) C ∈
µ
1−π2
4
p,
π2(h2−p2)
2(p+πh)
¶
2p C ≥ π
2(h2−p2)
2(p+πh)
Expected surplus of voting procedure 2:
2
π2(h2−p2)+2c(p−πh)
2πh−p(1+π2) for C <
1
2
(πh− p)
2p for C ≥ 1
2
(πh− p)
First of all, the surplus generated by delegation exceeds the surplus obtained by
voting procedure V2 if signals are relatively inexpensive, C < 12 (πh− p), while
delegation and V2 perform equally well for more costly signals. The intuition is
that for C < 1
2
(πh− p), a signal is bought with probability one under delegation,
but with probability lower than one under V2. If and when a signal is bought, V2
requires double acceptance even though the a priori expected value of the project
is positive. V2 is too strict. Moreover, if no signal is bought, projects are accepted
with probability one. This further reduces the performance relative to delegation.
Secondly, just as in the benchmark case of the naive voter in section 3, if (πh−p)
2
<
p1−π
2
2
the voting procedure V1 is at least as good as delegation D for all C.
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If, on the other hand (πh−p)
2
> p1−π
2
4
, the price of information matters. For
inexpensive signals, C < C1 := p
(p+πh)−π2(p+πh)
2(p+πh)+p(1−π2) , voting is best, whereas for more
costly signals, C > C1, delegation is best. If signals are relatively expensive it is
better to buy just one signal than to have a chance of two being bought.3 For C ≥
π2h2−π2p2
2(p+πh)
signals have become prohibitively expensive, and everyone votes favourably
without having bought a signal as the a priori expected value of a project is positive.
In this case, delegation and voting perform equally well. There is a small interval
of costly signals in which voting turns out to be better than delegation. This is the
case for C ∈
³
π2h2−p2
2(p+πh)
, π
2h2−π2p2
2(p+πh)
´
, where π
2h2−p2
2(p+πh)
> C1. For these values of C, signals
have become too costly to be bought under delegation, and the agent votes Yes in
the absence of a signal. On the other hand, in the voting procedure, information is
still bought, be it with a small probability.
We can now illustrate the general point made in the introduction: decision struc-
tures have to be evaluated not just on the basis of their appropriateness in terms of
aggregation of private information, but also in terms of the incentives they provide
to generate private information. In case of the naive voter, where incentives are
absent, delegation is better than the voting procedure V1 if C > 12 (1− π2) p. In
case of full strategic behaviour, where agents make a conscious choice whether to
buy costly information or not, delegation is better than V1 if C > C1. It is easy
to check that with strategic behaviour, delegation is the better structure for more
values of C. If the provision of incentives is immaterial, delegation performs worse
than V1in the range C ∈
¡
C1,
1
2
(1− π2) p¢. If the process of information gathering is
endogenised, and the incentives to obtain private information assume an important
role, delegation outperforms V1 in this range.
3There is one exception: if (πh−p)2 < C1, then voting procedure V1 is better than delegation for
all C. This is the case, if, e.g., the possible loss is almost negligible, or πh− p ≈ 0.
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7 Discussion
In their analysis of Condorcet Jury Theorem, Austen—Smith and Banks (1996) re-
placed the behavioral assumption of sincere voting by rational voting. They left the
assumption that information is exogenously distributed untouched. In this paper
we make a step similar to theirs: we endogenize the acquisition of information by
assuming agents to rationally purchase information or not. Hence, the capacity of a
collective decision procedure to provide incentives to acquire information becomes
as important as its capacity to aggregate private information.
In a two—agent model, we have compared a delegation structure with two voting
rules that make project implementation either dependent on one or on two favorable
votes. Delegation provides stronger incentives to acquire information than voting:
under delegation one’s vote will be decisive, whereas under voting its decisiveness
depends on what the other votes. This reduced incentive to acquire information
under voting procedures has to be compared with the desirable aspect of information
aggregation that characterizes such procedures. Clearly, the cheaper information is,
and the more a second piece of information adds to a first piece, the more attractive
voting becomes.
Our analysis sheds light on the discussion concerning the Jury Theorem. Where
mixed strategies ruling the voting behavior save the Jury Theorem when information
is exogenous, we have shown such behavior to have disastrous effects on welfare once
information has to be acquired by rational agents. Mixed strategies when voting
make agents also indifferent between acquiring information and remaining ignorant.
The expected payoff to each agent is then equal to the expected payoff when no
information is acquired at all. We have also shown that other equilibria exist in
which agents vote sincerely and buy information with a positive probability.
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Replacing the naive agent by its strategic counterpart has a second important
consequence. It increases the ‘robustness’ of voting procedures. By this, we mean
the following. In case of naive agents, we showed that the better voting procedure
for p > 0 is V1. By the same token, V2 is the better voting rule for p < 0. The
introduction of strategically behaving agents reduces the performance of V1 and
increases the performance of V2 for p > 0. Vice versa, for p < 0, acting strategically
increases the surplus obtained from V1 and reduces the performance of V2. Hence,
if an organizational designer or a legislator were somehow forced to use one and the
same voting procedure for all possible projects, be they of positive or negative value,
strategic behavior reduces the errors made. Allowing for strategic behavior helps
agents to overcome the rigidities of what would otherwise have been the inferior
voting procedure.
In the literature on collective decision-making, the Jury Theorem is sometimes
regarded as the rationale for democracy. Piketty (1999, pp. 793-4) remarks “[the
Jury Theorem] expresses in a formal way the commonsensical view according to
which democracy is a good system tot the extent that one is ready to assume that
‘more than half of the people are right more than half of the time’... It provides
us with the most basic (and most fundamental) rationale for the most basic polit-
ical institution.” In the same spirit Ladha (1997, p. 617) writes: “The theorem
thus provides a mathematical basis for majority-rule voting and potentially gives
an important clue to our understanding of the strength of democratic government.”
Is our result that it is sometimes optimal to delegate decisions on public issues
to individuals an argument against democracy? We do not think so. Most existing
democracies are representative rather than direct. The traditional argument for rep-
resentative democracy is that it leads to more informed policy decisions than direct
democracy (Cukierman and Spiegel, 1998). Moreover, in democracies we usually
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observe a wide variety of decision procedures. The executive makes some decisions.
Others are made in Parliament. But also civil servants make numerous decisions.
In democracies, elected politicians often delegate policy decisions to civil servants.
Our model demonstrates that providing incentives for acquiring information is a
rationale for delegation. Of course we are aware that our two-agent model cannot
fully describe under what conditions decision should be delegated. We are quite
confident, however, that incentives for acquiring information are important.
Appendix
Let V2 be the voting rule.
Proposition 1 If C ≤ πh−p
2
, then there is one symmetric strategy profile in which
with positive probability a signal is bought.
Proof. The proof is in two steps. We first determine the probability γi that i
votes Y if bi. When bi and i votes N , i’s payoff equals 0. When bi and i votes Y , i’s
expected payoff equals
(p+ h) Pr (G|bi)
·
αj
µ
π +
1
2
(1− π)(1 + γj)
¶
+ (1− αj)
¸
+
(p− h) Pr (B|bi)
·
αj
µ
1
2
(1− π) + (π + 1
2
(1− π))γj
¶
+ (1− αj)
¸
(A.1)
where αi is the probability that i buys a signal. Using Pr (G|bi) = 12(1 − π) and
Pr (B|bi) = 12(1 + π), it is straightforward to verify that the expression in (A.1)
equals zero if
γ∗ =
α (1− π2) p+ 2 (1− α) (p− πh)
α (2πh− p (1 + π2)) (A.2)
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Since γ∗ ≥ 0, α ≤ 2(πh−p)
2πh−p(1+π2) The second step is to determine α
∗, the equilibrium
value of αi. Two cases need to be distinguished: (i) α ≤ 2(πh−p)2πh−p(1+π2) , so that γ∗ = 0,
and (ii) α > 2(πh−p)
2πh−p(1+π2) , so that γ
∗ > 0. In (i), the expected payoff of buying equals
(p+ h) Pr (G) [αj
µ
π2 + 2π (1− π) 1
2
+ (1− π)2 1
4
¶
+
(1− αj)
µ
π + (1− π) 1
2
¶
] +
(p− h) Pr (B)
·
αj (1− π)2 1
4
+ (1− αj) (1− π) 1
2
¸
− C
=
1
2
αjπ (p+ h) +
1
4
αj (1− π)2 p+ 1
2
(1− α) (p+ πh)− C (A.3)
whereas the expected payoff of not buying equals
(p+ h) Pr (G)
·
αj
µ
π + (1− π) 1
2
¶
+ (1− αj)
¸
+
(p− h) Pr (B)
·
αj (1− π) 1
2
+ (1− αj)
¸
= (1− αj) p+ 1
2
αj (p+ πh) (A.4)
In a mixed equilibrium, player i is indifferent between buying and not buying. Lim-
iting attention to symmetric equilibrium, this amounts to
α∗ =
2 (πh− p)− 4c
2πh− p (1 + π2) (A.5)
Since the denominator of this expression is positive, α∗ satisfies the restriction α∗ ≤
2(πh−p)
2πh−p(1+π2) . A signal will be bought with positive probability if C ≤ πh−p2 . In (ii),
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when bi, agent i’s expected payoff is −C. When gi, i’s expected payoff is:
1
2
(1 + π)
·
π +
1
2
(1− π)(1 + γj)
¸
αj(p+ h)
1
2
(1− π)
·
1
2
(1 + π)γj +
1
2
(1− π)
¸
αj(p− h) + (1− α)(p+ πh)− C (A.6)
When i does not buy a signal, his expected payoff equals
1
2
·
1
2
(1 + π) +
1
2
(1− π)γj
¸
α(p+ h) +
1
2
·
1
2
(1− π) + 1
2
(1 + π)γj
¸
α(p− h) + (1− α)p (A.7)
Using (A.2), straightfoward algebra shows that (A.7) equals the mean of −C and
(A.6) if α = 2(πh−p)−2c
2πh−p(1+π2) . However, in (ii) α =
2(πh−p)
2πh−p(1+π2) . Hence, no symmetric
equilibrium exists in which γ∗ > 0.
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